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AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 

TO 1648 



FRANCES G. DAVENPORT 



Reprinted from the Annual Report of the American Historical Association 
for 1915, pages 151-161 




WASHINGTON 
1917 



AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 

TO 1648 



BY 

FRANCES G. DAVENPORT 



Reprinted from the Annual Report of the American Historical Association 
for 1915, pages 151-161 




WASHINGTON 
1917 



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VI. AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY TO 1648. 



By Frances G. Davenport, 

Carnegie Institution of Washington, D. C. 



151 



AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY TO 1648.* 



By Frances G. Davenport. 



In the last decade of the fifteenth century modern oversea com- 
merce began. With envious eyes the maritime nations of Europe 
beheld richly-laden ships returning from America, the west coast 
of Africa, or the East Indies, and unloading their precious freights 
in the harbors of Spain or Portugal. France and England, and 
later Holland and Denmark, determined to divert some of this 
wealth into their own treasuries. Since Spain and Portugal claimed 
a monopoly of the trade, the excluded countries could enter it in 
only two ways — by force, or by inducing Spain and Portugal to alter 
their laws and admit them to the commerce. The former method 
was the more immediately successful. By 1648, however, the method 
of diplomacy had won important victories. It is the main purpose 
of this paper to describe the principal diplomatic arrangements 
which up to 1G48, France, England, and the United Provinces, re- 
spectively, concluded with Portugal and Spain in regard to Ameri- 
can trade or territory. 

The history of the struggle of the European nations for partici- 
pation in the profits of the American trade naturally falls into three 
periods. In the first, France was the most formidable opponent of 
the Spanish-Portuguese monopoly. Jean Ango and his pilots led 
the attacking forces. This phase ended with the treaty concluded 
between France and Spain at Cateau-Cambresis in 1559. In the 
second period England took the place of France as the principal 
antagonist. Hawkins and Drake were the most conspicuous foes of 
Spain. This epoch extended to the treaty concluded between Eng- 
land and Spain at London in 1604. In the third period commercial 
maritime supremacy passed from England to the United Provinces. 
The Dutch West India Co., organized within this epoch, played 
a role similar in many respects to that of the French corsairs and 
English privateers; but in addition possessed great administrative 
powers. This period ended with the treaty concluded between the 
United Provinces and Spain at Minister in 1648. 

Jean Ango and his pilots, Hawkins and Drake, and the Dutch 
West India Co., each attacked the Spanish-Portuguese monopoly 

» Supporting evidence for the statements made in this paper will be found in the first 
volume to be published in 1917, of a collection of " European Treaties bearing or Ameri- 
can History " to be issued by the Carnegie Institution of Washington. 

153 



154 AMERICAN HISTOETCAL ASSOCIATION. 

for the sake of pecuniary gain; each represented a syndicate of 
capitalists, and had government support; and the profits of each 
were derived partly from trade and partly from booty. 

I. 

Throughout the first period, to 1559, France and Portugal were 
at peace ; while during a great part of the same interval France and 
Spain were at war. As between France and Spain, Portugal posed 
as neutral. This, however, did not suffice to protect her vast colonial 
trade and territory, which she was unable to defend. Jean Ango, 
like the directors of the Dutch West India Co., " dreamed of 
an empire in Brazil." But when his pilots reached Brazilian waters 
they met the crudest of receptions; and their sufferings caused them 
to undertake reprisals. The complaints arising from these reprisals, 
which Portugal, from 1516 onward, repeatedly made to France, 
proved unavailing and Portugal endeavored to frighten off the in- 
truders. In 1526 the King of Portugal ordered his subjects under 
pain of death to run down all French vessels going to or returning 
from these distant territories. This and other instances of harshness 
on the part of Portugal and also of Spain toward interlopers were 
defended chiefly on the ground that the intruders were pirates, and 
that treaties provided that pirates should be put to death. On this 
pretext Charles V refused for a time to send back to France the 
companions of Fleury (the captor of Montezuma's treasure), al- 
though the treaty of Cambray had provided for the mutual return 
of all prisoners of war. For the same reason Philip II refused to 
deliver over the survivors of the Florida massacre, although the 
French ambassador protested that their enterprise was authorized 
by the Admiral of France. Under this name Hawkins, returning 
to England after a peaceful trading voyage, was denounced by the 
Spanish ambassador. Other instances might be cited. 

But whatever the excuse for Portugal's treatment of French 
corsairs, France could not tamely accept it. In 1528 Francis I 
affirmed the principle of freedom of trade " as of all rights one of 
the most natural." Following a practice then in use, he granted to 
Ango and to one of his associates letters of marque, giving them the 
right to reimburse themselves for the losses which they had suffered 
from the Portuguese. General letters of marque were also issued 
enjoining the French admirals to permit all their captains, wherever 
they should be, to run down the Portuguese, seize their persons, 
goods, or merchandise and bring them to France. In 1531 the King 
of Portugal complained that the French had captured 300 of his 
ships. Unable to defend himself by force, he employed gold, and 
by bribing the French admiral managed to have Ango's letters of 






AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY TO 1648 155 

marque revoked. In obtaining this revocation he was also helped 
by the intervention of the Emperor, Charles V, who in the matter 
of defending the oversea trade identified the interests of Portugal 
with his own. The reason for this identification is not far top seek — 
the Portuguese Islands of Madeira and the Azores were situated on 
or near the routes of ocean commerce. The Spanish fleets returning 
from America put in at the Azores, hence Spain must always keep 
on the best terms with Portugal. Hence, also, the Emperor's dis- 
pleasure when in 1536 Portugal concluded a treaty with France 
which permitted the French to bring their prizes — i. e., Spanish 
ships — into all Portuguese havens and had the effect of making the 
harbors of the Azores and Madeira as well as of Portugal lurking 
places from which the French preyed upon the ocean shipping of 
Spain. In return Francis I forbade his subjects to sail to Brazil 
and Guinea; but when a few years later Portugal's bribery of the 
French admiral was discovered this prohibition was revoked. 

The activities of Ango's captains were directed not only against 
their Portuguese friends but also against their Spanish enemies. 
The sensational capture made by one of them of a part of Monte- 
zuma's treasure has already been referred to. In 1523 and 1525 the 
Cortes of Castile complained of the frequent and intolerable depre- 
dations committed by the French at sea, and their feeling appears 
to be reflected in the treaty of Madrid in 1526. 

The question of admitting the French to the American trade seems 
to have been discussed in the negotiations for the Franco-Spanish 
truce of 1538, as it certainly was in connection with the treaty of 
1544. In 1541 the Emperor had been greatly disturbed by Cartier's 
plan to colonize in Canada. Despairing of keeping the French 
altogether away from the new world, Charles V was willing to come 
to terms with them. 

An article signed by the French commissioners in 1544 contained 
the following stipulation: That the King of France, his successors 
and subjects, would leave the Emperor and the King of Portugal at 
peace in all that concerned the East and West Indies and would not 
attempt any discoveries or other enterprises there. French subjects 
might, for purposes of trade only, go to both the East and the West 
Indies, but if they committed any acts of violence in going or return- 
ing they should be punished. This article was apparently acceptable 
to the Emperor and Prince Philip and to the president of the Council 
of the Indies. Other councilors believed that the permission to trade 
would lead to further trouble, because the French would not conduct 
it in accordance with regulations. The Council of the Indies urged 
that in this as in former treaties matters pertaining to the Indies 
should not be mentioned at all. If, however, the French were per- 
mitted to trade they should be held to the laws prohibiting the 



156 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

removal of gold and silver from territory subject to Castile, even in 
exchange for merchandise, and their homeward-bound ships should 
be obliged to touch at Cadiz or San Lucar. The King of Portugal 
also objected to the article, declaring that the French went in armed 
ships not only for the purpose of trading but in order to rob with 
more security. The article seems never to have been ratified. 

In the truce between France and Spain concluded in 1556 it was 
agreed that during the period of the truce the French should not 
sail to or trade in the Spanish Indies without license from the King 
of Spain. In a few months the truce was violated. The Venetian 
ambassador ascribed the rupture partly to the sending of French 
ships to the Indies " to occupy some place and hinder the naviga- 
tion." The reference is to Villegagnon's colony in Brazil, which 
seemed a danger to Spain as well as to Portugal. 

In the negotiations for the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, in 1559, 
the right of the French to go to the Spanish Indies was discussed 
repeatedly and at length. 

The Spanish commissioners urged that Villegagnon should be 
recalled. They based their claim to a monopoly of the western navi- 
gation on the bulls of Popes Alexander VI and Julius II, and on the 
fact that Spain alone had borne the labor and expense of discovery. 
The French deputies argued that the sea was common. They would 
not consent to exclude Frenchmen from places discovered by them 
and not actually subject to the Kings of Portugal or Castile. On 
the other hand, they would agree that the French should keep away 
from lands actually possessed by the aforesaid sovereigns ; or, as an 
alternative, that the Indies should not be mentioned, and if French- 
men were found doing what they should not there, they might be 
chastised. King Philip did not approve of the former alternative. 
The Indies were therefore not mentioned in the treaty, but an oral 
agreement was made, the precise wording of which is not known. 
From accounts in Spanish and French documents it appears that it 
was to the effect that Spaniards and Frenchmen encountering one 
another west of the prime meridian might treat each other as enemies, 
without thereby giving ground for complaint of the violation of 
existing treaties. The location of the prime meridian remained a 
matter of dispute. In 1634 the King of France placed it at the 
island of Ferro, in the Canaries. Richelieu stated that Spain pre- 
ferred to locate it farther west, in the Azores, because ships captured 
west of the prime meridian must be declared good prize. 

The rule that might would be the only right recognized between 
nations west of the prime meridian was the one permanent result of 
Spanish-French diplomacy regarding America up to 1559, or indeed 
up to 1648. In the treaty of Vervins, in 1598, no better arrangement 
could be agreed on. 



AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY TO 1648 157 

II. 

During the wars of religion in France the maritime strength of 
that nation fell to its lowest ebb. Leadership in maritime affairs, 
and hence in the effort to force an entrance into the American 
trade, passed to England — the second great antagonist of the Portu- 
guese-Spanish monopoly. In 1553 a joint-stock company was 
founded in London for the Guinea trade. This intrusion of the 
English into regions claimed by Portugal led to repeated complaints 
by the ambassador of Portugal, who was supported by the ambas- 
sador of Spain. Important negotiations relative to the commerce 
with Portuguese colonies were in progress in 1555, 1561, 1562, and 
from 1569 to 1576. The treaty signed in 1576 permitted the English 
to trade in Madeira and the Azores, but did not mention Barbary, 
Guinea, or Brazil. 

Between 1562 and 1568 Hawkins made three slave-trading voyages 
to the West Indies. Subsequently English privateers played havoc 
with Spanish shipping there, and in 1580 Drake returned from his 
voyage around the globe with treasure estimated at a million and a 
half sterling. The Spanish ambassador in London wrote that Drake 
was preparing for another voyage and that everybody wanted to 
have a share in the expedition. He therefore considered it in the 
King of Spain's interest that orders be given that no foreign ship 
should be spared in either the Spanish or the Portuguese Indies, but 
that every one should be sent to the bottom. War followed in a 
few years. Peace negotiations took place in 1588, 1600, and 1604. 
The negotiations of 1588 were insincere, at least on the part of 
Spain, in whose ports the Armada was preparing. But they have an 
interest as indicating England's attitude. Of her two main griev- 
ances against Spain, one was the restrictions imposed by Spain upon 
English trade to the newly discovered lands. The instructions issued 
to Elizabeth's commissioners also, in so far as they relate to the 
West Indies, are of interest. For they indicate that England based 
her claim to trade in the Indies upon the ancient treaties concluded 
between Charles V and Henry VIII providing for reciprocal trade 
in all of their dominions. On this ground, in 1566, Cecil asserted 
a right to the Indian trade, and the claim seems to explain Philip 
II's reluctance to renew these treaties. The Spanish view was that 
the Indies were a new world, to which treaties between European 
powers did not apply unless the Indies were indubitably referring to 
them. 

Not until after the death of Elizabeth could peace be made. After 
the accession of King James negotiations were again undertaken. 
Concerning trade to the East and West Indies an arrangement was 
then effected, though no real agreement was reached. The instruc- 



158 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

tions of the English commissioners in this matter were identical 
with those for the negotiations of 1600. They sanctioned only one 
concession, that Englishmen should be prohibited from going to any 
places in the Indies where the Spaniards were actually " planted " — 
a principle embodied in the charter granted to the English East 
India Co. on December 31, 1600. It was rejected by the Spaniards, 
who insisted that the English should be excluded from every part 
of the Indies, either expressly or by clear implication; or else that 
the King of England should declare in writing that his subjects 
would trade in the Indies at their own peril. These demands the 
English refused. Cecil and Northampton alleged that an express 
prohibition to trade would wrong James's honor since Spain had not 
put it in the treaties made with France and other princes. After 
much debate it was resolved that intercourse should be permitted 
in those places " in which there was commerce before the war, ac- 
cording to the observance and use of former treaties." These words 
were differently interpreted by each party. Soon after the conclu- 
sion of the treaty Cecil wrote to the English Ambassador in France : 

If it be well observed how the [ninth] article is couched, you shall rather 
find it a pregnant affirmative for us than against us; for, sir, where it is writ- 
ten that we shall trade in all his dominions, that comprehends the Indies ; if 
you will say, secundum tractatus antiquos, no treaty excluded it. 

When the Venetian ambassador wished to hear from his majesty's 
own lips how he read the clause about the India navigation, and 
said, " Sire, your subjects may trade with Spain and Flanders, but 
not with the Indies." " What for no?" said the king. " Because," 
I replied, " the clause is read in that sense." " They are making a 
great error whoever they are who hold this view," said His Majesty ; 
"the meaning is quite clear." The Spaniards, on the other hand, 
resolutely affirmed that the terms of the peace excluded the English 
from the Indies. However, as was remarked in the instructions, 
Spain was not able to bar out the English by force, and the latter 
not only continued their trade in the East, but in spite of Spanish 
opposition proceeded to colonize Virginia under a charter which 
allotted to the grantees a portion of America " not actually pos- 
sessed by any Christian prince." 

III. 

The memorable year of 1580, which saw Drake's return to Eng- 
land, witnessed also Spain's annexation of Portugal's vast empire 
and trade. The threat of Spain's sudden aggrandizement brought 
France and England together; and toward the close of the century 
the United Provinces joined the alliance against the common enemy. 
Several treaties provided for joint naval operations by England and 



AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY TO 1648 159 

the United Provinces against Spain. Early in the seventeenth cen- 
tury the Dutch outstripped Spain in the race for commercial su- 
premacy. The Dutch East India Co., founded in 1602, under- 
mined the power of the Portuguese in the East; and in Guiana, 
Brazil, Guinea, Cuba, and Hispaniola, the Dutch were also prose- 
cuting an active trade. In 1607 peace negotiations between Spain 
and the United Provinces began. The hope of expelling the Dutch 
from the forbidden regions was believed by many to be the princi- 
pal motive that induced Spain to treat. Another reason was the 
project of a Dutch West India Co. " that should with a strong 
fleet carry at once both war and merchandize into America." Dur- 
ing the protracted negotiations one of the main points of dispute 
was the India trade. Both sides regarded the question as vital. The 
States brought forward three alternative means of accommodation: 
peace, with free trade to those parts of the Indies not actually pos- 
sessed by Spain; peace in Europe, and a truce in the Indies for a 
term of years with permission to trade during that period; trade to 
the Indies " at their peril " after the example of the French and 
English. The Catholic deputies totally rejected the first and third 
propositions, but would submit the second to Spain if it were accept- 
ably modified. They wished the States to declare expressly that 
they would abstain from going to the West Indies, and that in the 
East Indies they would not visit the places held by the Portuguese. 
The Dutch, who meanwhile had tried to frighten their opponents 
by showing a renewed interest in the West India Co., finally drafted 
what was deemed an acceptable article, but Spain insisted on their 
prompt withdrawal from both the East and West Indies as one 
of the two indispensable conditions for her recognition of their 
independence. Peace was unattainable, and negotiations were 
broken off. The French ambassador, however, persuaded the States 
to revive negotiations for a truce and to employ the French and 
English ambassadors as intermediaries. The principal point of dif- 
ficulty was the India trade. The French ambassador labored for the 
end desired by the Dutch not because France wished to strengthen 
them unduly but because she was unwilling to restore Spain to 
her former power or to play into the hands of the English, who 
were believed to desire the trade for themselves. An article was 
finally agreed on which was a concession of the India trade veiled 
by circumlocutions. Traffic was permitted in Spain's European lands 
and in any other of her possessions where her allies were permitted to 
trade. Outside these limits (i. e., in the Indies) subjects of the States 
could not traffic without express permission from the King in places 
held by Spain, but in places not thus held they might trade upon 
permission of the natives without hindrance from the King or his 
officers. The agreement that Spain would not hinder the subjects 



160 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

of the States in their trade " outside the limits " was also strength- 
ened by a special and secret treaty in which the name Indies was 
again avoided. The name, however, appeared in an act signed by 
the French and English ambassadors, which certified that the arch- 
dukes' deputies had agreed that, just as the Dutch should not traffic 
in places held by the King of Spain in the Indies without his per- 
mission, so subjects of the King of Spain should not traffic in places 
held by the States in the Indies without their permission. 

In 1621 the truce of 1609 expired and Spain declared war on the 
United Netherlands. Between 1621 and 1625 the Dutch negotiated 
with Denmark, France, and England to secure their alliance against 
Spain. The States General earnestly desired that these nations 
should co-operate with the Dutch West India Co., chartered by the 
States in 1621 for the purpose of attacking Spain's American pos- 
sessions and treasure fleets as well as for trade, but the Danes and 
French preferred rather to share in the East India commerce. In 
1621 the Dutch and Danish commissioners signed an agreement that 
in their journeys, trade, and navigation in the East and West Indies, 
Africa, and Terra Australis subjects of either party should befriend 
subjects of the other. The treaty between the Dutch and French 
merely stipulated that the question of traffic to the East and West 
Indies should be treated later by the French ambassador. The 
offensive alliance with England in 1625 enjoined attacks by both 
parties on Spain's dominions on both sides of the line and espe- 
cially on the treasure fleets, and one of the results of this treaty was 
the opening of trade between the Dutch and the English colonists 
in North America. 

During the 20 years following 1621 there were repeated negotia- 
tions for peace between the United Provinces and Spain. The most 
important took place in 1632 and 1633. They failed chiefly because 
no agreement could be reached on colonial matters, particularly those 
in which the Dutch West India Co. was involved. Since this com- 
pany had captured the port of Pernambuco, in Brazil, it looked for- 
ward to a rapid extension of its authority and trade in this region 
and to profits from raids undertaken thence against the Spanish 
treasure fleets, the West India Islands, and Central America. Hav- 
ing acquired a great fleet equipped for war, it opposed any peace or 
truce with Spain that should extend beyond the Line, unless, indeed, 
Spain would permit the Dutch to trade in both Indies. Since Spain 
refused these demands, negotiations ended fruitlessly. 

The negotiations at Minister from 1646 to 1618 were carried on 
under widely different circumstances from those of 1632, 1633, just 
mentioned. In 1646 peace was essential to the Spanish Government, 
exhausted by its efforts against domestic and foreign foes. Moreover, 
the chief obstacle to peace had been removed by her loss of Brazil 



AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY TO 1648. 161 

and other Portuguese colonies. On the other hand, the Dutch East 
and West India companies would willingly have continued the war. 
The West India Co. considered that if the two companies should be 
united it would be more profitable to continue hostilities in both 
Indies and Africa than to conclude any peace or truce with Spain. 
In case of a peace or truce the company desired freedom to trade in 
all places within the limits of its charter where the King of Spain had 
no castles, jurisdiction, or territory, and it further sought the ex- 
clusion of Spaniards from trade in all places similarly held by the 
company unless like privileges were granted to the company in 
places under the dominion of Spain. These stipulations were prac- 
tically those agreed to in the truce of 1609. Somewhat modified they 
were finally included in the treaty of Minister, a treaty in which for 
the first time Spain granted to another nation, as a permanent con- 
cession, in clear and explicit terms, and with mention of the Indies, 
the right to sail to, trade, and acquire territory in America. 

IV. 

By treaties concluded in 1641 and 1642, Portugal, newly liberated 
from Spain, had legalized the trade which the Dutch and English 
had previously established with the African coast, and recognized 
Dutch possession of a part of Brazil. 

Thus, in the fifth decade of the seventeenth century, the two 
Iberian powers, then bitterly estranged from each other, were both 
compelled to concede to certain European nations the right to occu- 
pation and trade in those oversea lands from which, since the period 
of discovery, they had endeavored to exclude them- But, as old 
walls were breached, new ones were erected. The Dutch, English, 
and French, having acquired much oversea territory and commerce, 
each tried to use them for the exclusive profit of their respective 
peoples, or even of certain of their own trading companies. Hence 
in 1648 the ideal of free ocean commerce and navigation, conceived 
long before by Grotius, remained unrealized. 
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